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NOTES
EDUCATION VOUCHERS-CHALLENGE TO THE WALL OF
SEPARATION?
INTRODUCTION
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
Under the proposed voucher system, a publicly accountable
agency would issue a voucher for a year's schooling for each
eligible child. This voucher could be turned over to any school
which had agreed to abide by the rules of the voucher system.
Each school would turn in its vouchers for cash.'
It must be remembered that the very existence of the
religious school-whether Catholic or Mormon, Presbyterian
or Episcopalian-is to provide an education oriented to the
dogma of the particular faith.'
And because it seems so innocuous and well-intended
(who would deny a handout to the little children?), the move-
ment to do just a little shattering of the wall which separates
private belief from public power is doubly dangerous.'
The above quoted passages serve to illustrate that events widely
separated in time do often come together to create the conflicts which
rock the very foundation of our society. In 1791 the first amendment to
the Constitution of the United States was ratified.5 In 1955 an economist
proposed that the state give money to parents to be used in securing
education for their children in whatever schools the parents might
choose.' In 1970 a federal government executive office' proposed to
implement such a plan.'
The events have transpired at differing points upon the continuum
of time, but the conflict they generate when considered together is now
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS 2 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as JENKS REPORT and referred to as Jenks Report or the Report].
3. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 262 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
4. Weir, Coming: Parochiaid-A Loss for All Americans, 50 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
505 (1969).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE
PUBLIc INTEREST 126 (R. Solo ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as Friedmann].
7. The Office of Economic Opportunity.
8. Basic information concerning the proposed voucher experiment is contained in
the Jenks Report.
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being felt. School boards are looking for new or alternative methods of
financing schools.' Concurrently, voters are refusing to approve many
new school tax proposals." Parents are voicing their beliefs that schools
are "unresponsive;"'" others, those who send their children to private
or parochial schools, say that they are being taxed doubly, once for the
public schools and once in the tuition they must pay.'2 Other voices cry
out that those who choose to send their children to schools other than the
public schools must pay the price of exercising their free choice.'"
The purpose of this note is to discuss the background events that
have led to the proposal of education vouchers, to enumerate the features
of a typical plan, to present the main non-legal arguments for and against
the plan, and, finally and primarily, to deliberate upon the plan against
the fabric of the first amendment, as applied to the several states through
the fourteenth amendment. 1
THE VOUCHER PLAN-WHY?
The voucher plan in its basic form is quite simple. Essentially, a
voucher or check would be issued to a family for each school age child.
The amount of the voucher would represent the average per year cost
of educating a child in the public schools. The family could select any
approved school of its choice, public or private, and enroll the child
therein. The voucher would be given to the school as payment of tuition
charges; the various schools could then exchange their collected vouchers
for cash. 5
While this plan seems simple enough, the actual operation of a
voucher system is much more complex. Certain aspects of this complexity
will be discussed in a later section of this note.'
Two Reasons for Vouchers
Two basic reasons have been advanced in support of the voucher
plan. Others exist, no doubt, but to include every possible or even
logical reason would prolong this discussion without point. These two
fundamental arguments contain the elements of most others.
9. Fox & Levenson, In Defense of the "Harmful Monopoly," 51 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 131 (1969).
10. Id.
11. JENKS REPORT 1.
12. C. BENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIc EDUCATION 326 (1961).
13. Fox & Levenson, supra note 9, at 133.
14. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (dictum).
15. JENKS REPORT 2.
16. See notes 62-72 infra and accompanying text.
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The first argument was advanced by Milton Friedmann in 1955."7
It is based upon economic concepts espoused by Friedmann. The primary
point of this argument is that the public has an interest in providing a
certain minimum education for all children. To do so permits the children
to become more effective citizens and thus provides a desired benefit to
the society in general. Friedmann, however, found no such benefit on
which to justify public operation of the schools and concluded that the
competition engendered by a school's need to get and keep students
would produce a much improved educational product."8
The second argument to be mentioned is that large numbers of
children, principally those from ghetto and other low income areas, are
seriously disadvantaged by their inability to obtain an education geared
to their needs. The disadvantage is self-sustaining and virtually per-
petual; children who receive a poor education grow into adults who
suffer chronic unemployment and attendant economic difficulties. Their
children, in turn, become the disadvantaged of the next generation
because the public schools of the ghetto have been and are inadequate.
A voucher plan would enable these children to escape the ghetto and
obtain adequate schooling on a competitive basis with children from
more affluent families. 9
Thus, it may be seen that the arguments are related; both contain
the common element of free choice in the selection of schools. Yet they
are distinguishable and have been advanced by different persons or
agencies."
THE EDUCATION VOUCHER EXPERIMENT
While a number of programs to aid education have been proposed
or enacted,2 the voucher plan under consideration here has not yet
reached fruition.2 However, an agency of the federal Government is
now planning a voucher experiment and hopes to implement a pilot
program in the near future. 8 It is likely that the demonstration would be
17. Friedmann 126.
18. Id. at 127.
19. JENKS R.EPORT 16.
20. The arguments made by Professor Friedmann seem primarily economic in con-
cept; the arguments advanced by the Jenks Report stem from the desire to improve the
educational lot of disadvantaged children.
21. Such programs include those which would provide direct grants to private
schools as well as so-called purchase of services plans. The latter involves government
payment of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in parochial schools or govern-
ment reimbursement to parochial schools for the costs' of providing secular education.
22. Initial research on the voucher plan was begun in December, 1969, by the
Center for the Study of Public Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
23. The voucher experiment was apparently intended to begin in September, 1971.
1971]
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funded by, and subject to the regulation of, the Office of Economic
Opportunity.24 A local school district desiring to participate in a voucher
experiment would, presumably, be left free to adapt the plan to its own
peculiar situation so long as the OEO's general requirements are met.25
The Plan
The Education Voucher Experiment proposed by the OEO is the
work of Christopher Jenks, Co-Director of the Center for the Study of
Public Policy and Associate Professor of Education, Harvard University,
and his staff. Various proposals are discussed at length in a report'
prepared for the OEO by the Center. The Report considers seven
alternative plans, each of which may be varied from the basic outline. 7
In each, the per pupil expenditure is at least equal to the pre-experiment
public school expenditures in the district.28 Since schools may wish to
obtain additional funds, various plans present differing means of so
doing.2" The plans, in outline, are as follows:
1. Unregulated Market Model: The value of the voucher is
the same for each child. Schools are permitted to charge
whatever additional tuition the traffic will bear.
2. Unregulated Compensatory Model: The value of the
voucher is higher for poor children. Schools are permitted
to charge whatever additional tuition they wish.
3. Compulsory Private Scholarship Model: Schools may
charge as much tuition as they like, provided they give
scholarships to those children unable to pay full tuition.
Eligibility and size of scholarships are determined by the
[Education Voucher Agency], which establishes a formula
showing how much families with certain incomes can be
charged.
4. The Effort Voucher: This model establishes several different
possible levels of per pupil expenditure and allows a school
to choose its own level. Parents who choose high-expendi-
ture schools are then charged more tuition (or tax) than
Although definite information is difficult to obtain, there seems to be some question of
whether a program can be instituted by that date.
24. Hereinafter referred to as OEO.
25. JENKs REPoRT, Preface, at v.
26. JENKS REPORT.
27. Id. at 19.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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parents who choose low-expenditure schools. Tuition (or
tax) is also related to income, in theory the "effort"
demanded of a low-income family attending a high-expendi-
ture school is the same as the "effort" demanded of a high-
income family in the same school.
5. "Egalitarian" Model: The value of the voucher is the
same for each child. No school is permitted to charge any
additional tuition.
6. Achievement Model: The value of the voucher is based on
the progress made by the child during the year.
7. Regulated Compensatory Model: Schools may not charge
tuition beyond the value of the voucher. They may "earn"
extra funds by accepting children from poor families or
educationally disadvantaged children. (A variant of this
model permits privately managed voucher schools to charge
affluent families according to their ability to pay.)"o
The plan recommended by the study is the so-called "Regulated
Compensatory Model."'" In this plan, every child would receive a
voucher "roughly equal to the cost of the public schools of his area."2
No participating school would be permitted to charge tuition in excess
of the voucher amount. Parochial schools would receive only a stated
percentage of the basic voucher to insure that funds not be expended for
sectarian purposes.8"
Supplemental vouchers, in varying amounts up to the basic voucher
level, would be given to "disadvantaged" children. 4 This would provide
economic incentive for schools to enroll such students, thus fulfilling
at least one of the fundamental objectives of the experiment.8" Schools
might also seek additional funds from other sources.86
Divers other aspects of the "Regulated Compensatory Model" are
here omitted." These consist of various means of regulating exact
voucher amounts and admissions problems and are not relevant to the
purpose of this note.
30. Id. at 20.
31. Id. at 109.
32. Id. at 50.
33. Id. at 109.
34. Id. at 50.
35. Id. at 8.
36. Id. at 50.
37. See id. at 50-56.
et al.: Education Vouchers—Challenge to the Wall of Separation?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
VOUCHERS-PRO AND CON
Professor Friedmann's Stand
Professor Friedmann's proposal3 is perhaps best characterized as
laissez-faire; it is apparently based upon the concepts of Friedmann's
economic philosophies and provides for public financing, but not opera-
tion, of schools.39
Friedmann's basic idea proceeds from the division of education into
two functions: 1) subsidizing educational costs and 2) operating in-
structional institutions." These two functions, he says, are separable;
government can and should finance education but should leave parents
free to select the school they wish their child to attend."
The plan is relatively free from restraints and regulations.
The role of government would be limited to assuring that the
schools met certain minimum standards such as the inclusion
of a minimum common content in their programs, much as it
now inspects restaurants to assure that they maintain minimum
sanitary standards."
Friedmann further states that the public monopoly in education is
inefficient, costly and not responsive to the needs of its "customers."4 3
Competition would widen the range of choice for parents, create a more
efficient school system and reduce social stratification.4 4 Although the
best solution might be a mixture of types of schools, some private and
some public,4" it is conceivable that public school facilities might even-
tually be sold to private operators. 6
The Arguments Against Friedmann's Plan
The mere fact that the two functions mentioned above, financing
and operation, are separable is scarcely a valid reason to sever them.
Some government intrusion into education, inspection for example, is
a salient feature of the plan.4 ' It is at least arguable that government can
38. Friedmann 126.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 127.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Interview with Milton Friedmann, appearing on The Advocate, NATIONAL
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, October 20, 1970.
44. Friedmann 129-30.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 132.
47. Id. at 127.
574
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more efficiently regulate that which it also operates.
Whether or not this assertion is true, the problems of regulating
myriad schools not under direct governmental control would be immense.
The present school system has a "chain of command" running from
teacher to department head to principal to superintendent to school
board. The individual teacher is usually required to teach a more or
less standard content and is subject to direct supervision by his superiors.
These supervisors are, in turn, responsible to higher authority, usually
on the state level, which has established the curriculum to provide for
a "common core of values deemed requisite for social stability" in
society. 8
In contrast, many of the schools which Friedmann feels "will spring
up to meet the demand"4 will be operated and administered by in-
dividuals who seek to make a profit. They must package and market a
saleable commodity and make this package attractive to potential con-
sumers." Inspection at best would be cursory and difficult; at worst it
would be totally ineffective. Some opponents of the plan argue that
"appropriate safeguards for quality could [not] be implemented without
greatly increased governmental control and influence throughout both
the public and private education institutions."51
Friedmann himself admits that the voucher system would initially
be more expensive to operate than the present system.52 While it is
difficult to specuL_.e about the future, it seems reasonable to assume
that educational costs would follow the general trend of other prices in
our economy. This trend is, of course, upward.
Other proponents of the voucher plan point to a goal which is at
odds with Friedmann's purpose of reducing costs, i.e., that expenditures
for education would actually increase under a voucher system. 8 This
would follow since 1) education is presently under-invested and 2) most
families would supplement the voucher allowance with additional funds.5'
One writer has even suggested that public schools would have more
dollars per pupil available if a shift of pupils to private schools occurred.5
48. C. BENSON, supra note 12, at 322.
49. Friedmann 129.
50. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that privately operated schools par-
ticipating in a voucher plan would seek to gain students by use of advertising. Con-
ceivably, parents might select schools in much the same way they now select and purchase
breakfast cereals, cosmetics, appliances and used cars.
51. Fox & Levenson, supra note 9, at 134.
52. Interview, supra note 43.
53. Fox & Levenson, supra note 9, at 132.
54. Id. at 132-33.
55. Renshaw, Meeting Educational Revenue Requirements in the Decade Ahead,
141 AM. ScH. BD. J., July, 1960, 17, 32.
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This author writes that "the effect of an increased enrollment in non-
public schools has been to increase the funds available per pupil ... in the
public schools."'" This position presupposes conditions which would not
exist in a voucher plan. When students have transferred from public
schools in the past, public funds have not followed them. Under a
voucher plan, money once available to a public school would be paid to
the transferee school.
Furthermore some [persons] felt that the drain on the
public purse would lead legislators to reduce the basic voucher
support level as taxation became more difficult. Thus the support
level of the publicly operated systems would also be reduced
while those who could afford to do so would be obligated to put
out increasing amounts to supplement the tuition grants for
their children in private institutions. There is, then, the strong
possibility that these two factors might operate together so as
to diminish rather than increase the public support of education
and likewise the total investment by society in elementary and
secondary education."
No doubt alternatives to public schools would arise if a voucher
plan were begun. Parents would have a wider choice of alternatives.
However, this apparent benefit must be tempered by the realization that
establishing a school would require considerable capital outlay for facili-
ties and equipment. In addition, there seems to be no clear consensus that
free choice would be a necessary outgrowth of the voucher plan." Even
Friedmann admits that "the establishment of private schools does not of
itself guarantee the desirable freedom of choice on the part of parents." 9
Because the plan contains no provision for additional aid to children
from low income groups, greater social stratification may well result.
Those who are able may supplement the voucher and seek higher priced
schools. Others, unable or unwilling to pay more, may be relegated
to the public schools or those charging lower fees. This would, in Fuller's
view, 0 inject a note of divisiveness into society. "The minority public
school with its underprivileged clientele could no longer be an effective
force for unity."'"
56. Id.
57. Fox & Levenson, supra note 9, at 133.
58. Id.
59. Friedmann 131.
60. Fuller, Go'vernment Financing of Public and Private Education, 47 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 365, 371 (1966).
61. Id.
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In sum, each benefit advanced by proponents can be countered by an
opposing argument. Little light is shed on the subject by dialectics.
The OEO Viewpoint
The position of the OEO, as enounced by the Jenks Report,8 2 is
twofold. First, schools and school boards work "clumsily and ineffec-
tively."8 They are unresponsive and relatively immune to attack or
change.64 "As a result, effective control over the character of the public
schools is largely vested in legislators, school boards, and educators,
not parents." 5
Secondly, disadvantaged children must be aided to secure higher
quality education in order to "close the gap" between the advantaged
and disadvantaged. 8 Social problems result from various inequalities;
closing the education gap will aid in the solution of social ills by fostering
more equitable distribution of wealth and power than now obtains. 7
The Opposition
Opposition to the voucher plan is widespread and vocal. However,
only limited amounts had appeared in print at the time this note was
prepared. Consequently, the present section does not adequately repre-
sent either the extent or depth of opposition to the plan.
Whether a voucher plan would actually give parents wider choice
in the selection and operation of schools seems questionable. Opponents
argue that such freedom would be limited as a practical matter because
of the paucity of alternative schools."8 Others argue that freedom of
choice is of little value since most parents are not qualified to make such
a choice."9
The second point of the OEO's position, that disadvantaged children
should be helped to obtain better quality education, seems the paramount
rationale for a voucher system. The plan selected by the Report con-
tains provisions for insuring that disadvantaged children become fi-
nancially attractive to schools and that various types of segregation do
not come into operation." While raising the general level of education in
62. JENKS REPORT.
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Id. at 8-9.
68. Fox & Levenson, supra note 9, at 133.
69. Id.
70. JENKS REPORT 8.
71. Id. at 11.
19711
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the society seems a laudable aspiration, voices will certainly arise in
opposition to an attempt to "homogenize" society.
In any event, the OEO program seems better equipped to fulfill its
purposes than the Friedmann proposal; it should be remembered, how-
ever, that the original Friedman proposal was merely an outline, a
skeleton. Professor Friedmann apparently now backs the OEO plan."'
THE FIRST AMENDMENT-WALL OR PORTAL?
Numerous attempts have been made to fuse various functions of
government and religion in the United States. Many cases have come
before the Supreme Court; in some the fusion was permitted while in
others it was rejected. The proposal of a voucher system to finance
education poses just such a dilemma.
If a voucher plan is instituted, parochial schools will undoubtedly
participate, and, even though the plan may contain provisions to keep the
functions of education and religion separate, the question of state aid to
religion will be in issue. It is not the purpose of this note to make a brief
either for or against religious education nor to take to task any particular
church group. The fact remains, however, that "the issue of state aid to
religious education in the United States is almost entirely the issue of
state aid to Catholic parochial schools."7 It was estimated in 1963 that
nearly six million children were enrolled in Catholic elementary and
secondary schools in the United States."' A 1960 estimate placed only
about 310,000 children in sectarian schools of other denominations."
The first amendment implications are obvious. Therefore, it will be
beneficial to consider some of the cases that have been before the Supreme
Court, what tests the Court devised to. deal with the cases, how the
voucher proposal purports to treat these issues and what the ultimate
disposition before the Court of a case involving the voucher plan may be.
Parochial Schools and the Constitution
The right of a parent to send his child to a parochial school was
established by Pierce v. Society of Sisters."6 This important case arose as
a challenge to the validity of an Oregon statute which required virtually
all children in the state to attend only public schools.77
72. Interview, supra note 43.
73. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FRaaom 509 (rev. ed. 1967) (footnote
omitted).
74. Id. at 510.
75. Id. at 509.
76. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
77. L. PrEtm, supra note 73, at 515.
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The challenge was made by a religious group, the Society of Sisters,
which operated and maintained a number of sectarian schools in Oregon.
The prime contention of the Society was not religious in character;
they complained of being deprived of the right to operate a profitable
business and of the possibility of losing the large financial investment
in buildings and equipment."8
While the decision thus rested on the ground of protection of
business, it did vindicate the right of a parent to select parochial educa-
tion as an alternative to the public schools. In other words, while the
state may require that children of certain ages attend schools, parents
have a constitutional right to satisfy the requirement by sending their
children to sectarian schools."9
In Meyer v. Nebraska,"0 the Court struck down state laws which
required the only language of instruction to be English and which
prohibited teaching any foreign language to a child who had completed
less than eight grades of school. The defendants, teachers in Lutheran
schools, were convicted of violating these laws by teaching Bible stories
in German.
The two cases serve to illustrate "that not only is the state con-
stitutionally inhibited from totally outlawing parochial schools, but also
from arbitrarily and unreasonably restricting their curriculum.""1 Thus,
a religious group may establish its own school, parents may send their
children to such a school and the school may, within certain limitations,
teach what it will in the manner it chooses.
Transportation, Health and Safety Measures
In Everson v. Board of Education,82 a local board of education,
pursuant to New Jersey statutory authorization, resolved to reimburse
parents within the district for the cost of bus transportation for their
children to and from schools. Some of the money was paid to parents of
students attending Catholic schools and Everson brought suit to chal-
lenge the practice.88 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld the practice;
transportation was compared to police and fire services and to health and
safety measures which are available to all citizens irrespective of
religion. 4 Justice Black, writing the majority opinion, stated that "[i]t
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
81. L. PFMFFER, supra note 73, at 517.
82. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id. at 17.
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is much too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the
opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no purpose.""
He thus dismissed Everson's contention that taxation for such purposes
was in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In a frequently quoted statement, Justice Black attempted to set
somewhat definitive limits upon the effect of the establishment clause
of the first amendment.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can set up a church; Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or
to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups or vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
a "wall of separation between Church and State."8
While Justice Black indicated that this decision took the concept
of separation to the "verge,"87 Justice Jackson, in his dissent,88 seemed
to fear that the decision would be extended in later cases to support
further types of aid to religious institutions. He noted that the function
of the parochial school was to foster and proselytize the school's faith
and that such practice was to "occupy the first place." 9 He touched the
question of the free exercise clause when he said that regulation often
accompanies aid."0
Justice Rutledge also feared later extension of the decision; he
thought that Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education9 had opened a
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 15-16.
87. Id. at 16.
88. Id. at 18.
89. Id. at 22-23.
90. Id. at 27.
91. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
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"breach" in the wall of separation." In Justice Rutledge's view, the
object of the first amendment
was to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehen-
sively forbidding every form of public aid or support for
religion. 3
Separation within the purview of the first amendment denoted that
"money taken by taxation from one is not to be used or given to support
another's religious training or belief, or indeed one's own."9 "
It seems clear that the split in the Court was not over whether
religion and government should be separate. The rift was based upon
the manner in which the facts of the case were to be applied to the
concept of separation. The majority felt that the payment of transporation
costs was not an aid to religion; such a program merely "help[s] parents
get their children ... safely and expeditiously to and from accredited
schools."95 The dissenters, on the other hand, felt that the program was an
aid to religion. "By no declaration that a gift of public money to religious
uses will promote the general or individual welfare, or the cause of educa-
tion generally, can legislative bodies overcome the Amendment's bar."9 6
In any event, busing was upheld. Everson provided a spring-
board for the very extension that the dissenters and even some of the
majority seemed to fear.
The School Prayer and Bible Reading Cases
In 1951 the New York State Board of Regents recommended that
local schools adopt a nonsectarian prayer for daily recitation." Although
few local boards adopted the prayer,9 the practice of one school using
the prayer was challenged in the courts.00 The case, Engel v. Vitale,'
eventually reached the Supreme Court which declared the practice
92. 330 U.S. 1, 29.
93. Id. at 31-32.
94. Id. at 44 (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 18.
96. Id. at 52.
97. Justice Douglas, who voted with the majority in Everson, later indicated that
he felt the decision to be an anomaly. He called Everson "out of line with the First
Amendment." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (concurring opinion). Perhaps
the case would have been decided differently had it come before the Court at a later date.
98. L. PFEFFER, supra note 73, at 461.
99. Id. at 463.
100. Id.
101. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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unconstitutional by a vote of 6-112
Justice Black, writing for the majority, indicated that New York
was using the public schools to pursue a religious activity' °3 contrary to
the strictures of the establishment clause."04 The Court made short work
of the contention that to strike down the prayer would be to establish a
religion of secularism, °5 thus decreeing that such a religious function
was not permissible in the public schools even though the prayer was
non-denominational and participation was not compulsory.0 6
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.°7 involved a
Pennsylvania statute requiring the reading of a number of verses from
the Bible without comment at the opening of public schools each day.
Any child who presented a written request of his parent or guardian
could be excused. The Court ruled that such practice violated the establish-
ment clause.' °8
102. Id. (Justice Frankfurter was ill and did not participate; there was also one
vacancy on the Court.)
103. . . . [B]y using its public school system to encourage recitation of the
Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly incon-
sistent with the Establishment Clause. There can, of course, be no doubt that
New York's program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as pre-
scribed in the Regents' prayer is a religious activity.
Id. at 424.
104. Such an activity was considered unconstitutional by the Court since
the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of
religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people
to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.
Id. at 425.
105. Justice Black wrote that
[i]t has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such a way as to pro-
hibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public
schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of
course, could be more wrong.
Id. at 433-34.
106. Justice Stewart was the sole dissenter; he indicated his belief that no
"official religion" could be established by the mere use of a prayer to open the school
day. He further stated his feeling that it might be a denial of free exercise of religion to
refuse permission to those who wished to recite the prayer. Id. at 445.
107. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
108. The case is important not only for the ruling but also for the test which was
announced.
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and primary effect
of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222 (citation omitted).
The test with some further modification, which will be discussed in a later section, is
still in use today. See notes 217-25 infra and accompanying text.
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Released Time
The question of "released time" from the public schools in order
that children might participate in religious training activities first came
before the Court in McCollum v. Board of Education."9 The essential
facts of McCollum are that the students of the public schools in Cham-
paign, Illinois, were permitted, upon written request of their parents, to be
released from their regular classes in order to participate in a period of
religious instruction on a weekly basis. The religious education classes
were held in the various school buildings and were conducted by in-
structors employed by an inter-denominational group. Children not par-
ticipating in the instructional program left rooms being used for religious
classes but were required to remain in the building. Zorach v. Clauson"'
presented released time in a slightly different context. The New York
City Board of Education, pursuant to a state statute,"' established a
released time procedure which permitted students, upon request of parent
or guardian, to leave the public school in order to attend a program of
religious instruction.'12
In holding that the released time plan in McCollum was uncon-
stitutional, the Court, again speaking through Justice Black, indicated
that such a practice was an aid to religion in spreading its doctrines
for at least two reasons: the program utilized public school facilities
and made use of the state's compulsory school attendance system." 8
Justice Douglas' opinion in Zorach distinguished the two cases on
the point that in McCollum public school facilities were used for the
religious programs, while in Zorach the instruction was conducted off
school property."' The opinion concluded that such a released time
109. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
110. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
111. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3210 (McKinney 1947).
112. 343 U.S. at 308.
113. Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are re-
leased in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the
religious classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established
and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faiths. And it falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Everson v.
Board of Education ....
Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings
used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords
sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their
religious classes through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery.
This is not separation of Church and State.
333 U.S. at 209-10, 212 (citation omitted).
114. 343 U.S. at 308-09.
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program, without coercion to attend and with no use of public school
facilities, was constitutional.
Justice Black vigorously dissented."' He found that the facts of
Zorach did not warrant a different result and emphasized that his
majority opinion in McCollum had stressed that the decision was not
based solely upon use of school property for religious instruction but
was applicable to any released time case."'
Justice Frankfurter, who perhaps left the door open for the majority
to distinguish Zorach and McCollum, also dissented."' He saw a dif-
ference between closing the doors of the schools and releasing all students
and permitting some students to leave during school hours for religious
purposes. Justice Frankfurter found coercion to attend the religious
observances even though the majority found none in the record, and
indeed, the lower court had excluded such evidence." 8 Justice Jackson
also found coercion because the state compelled attendance at the public
schools and then released some of the required time to the student on the
condition that the time so released be used for the purpose of attending
religious classes." 9
The importance of McCollum and Zorach to this discussion of the
voucher system is that while a released time program conducted in
the public school buildings offends the Constitution, one where the
115. Id. at 315.
116. Id. at 316. In contrast to his opinion in Everson, Justice Black here seems to
advocate total separation of church and state. "In considering whether a state has
entered this forbidden field the question is not whether it has entered too far but whether
it has entered at all." Id. at 318. His disapproval of the method used in Zorach to create
the church-state connection is characterized by his assertion that "[g]overnment should
not be allowed, under cover of the soft euphemism of 'co-operation,' to steal into the
sacred area of religious choice." Id. at 320.
117. In McCollum, Justice Frankfurter, apparently wishing to emphasize that no
other type program was being considered, stated: "We do not consider, as indeed we
could not, school programs not before us which, though colloquially characterized as
'released time,' present situations differing in aspects that may well be constitutionally
crucial." 333 U.S. at 231. The statement seems almost to anticipate the fact situation
which occurred in Zorach.
118. 343 U.S. at 321-22.
119. Id. at 323-24. Justice Jackson also stated his belief that, "[wie start down a
rough road when we begin to mix compulsory public education with compulsory god-
liness." Id. at 325. Noted attorney and author Leo Pfeffer has suggested that Zorach is
based upon the fiction
that the released-time program involves no more than that the public school
"closes its doors or suspends operations as to those who want to repair to their
religious sanctuary for worship or instruction." In reality, released time does
not mean releasing time for religious instruction; it means releasing children
for religious instruction and not releasing those who do not want to partake in
religious instruction.
L. PFEFFER, supra note 73, at 435.
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instruction is carried on away from the public schools does not. This
distinction will assume some importance in a later section of this note.'
The Book Cases
Although it is no longer of prime importance, Cochran v. Louisiana
State Board of Education.. deserves some mention. The case involved a
Louisiana statute which provided state funds to purchase school books
for all children, whether enrolled in public or private schools. The statute
was held valid in the face of challenge on the ground of its being an
unconstitutional deprivation of property for private purposes. Thus, the
first amendment was not directly considered and the case was decided
on the more nebulous grounds of the fourteenth amendment. Yet, one
aspect of the Schempp test appeared. The Court indicated that the
statute was not an aid to religion. "The school children and the state
alone are the beneficiaries."' 2 2 This statement seems to anticipate the
"primary effect" portion of the test announced in Schempp.
As regards the question of state aid to parochial schools, Board of
Education v. Allen.2 was of prime importance. Thus, Paul Freund
has stated that "[s]ince June 10, 1968, a discussion of state aid to
parochial schools can profitably start with the Supreme Court decision of
that date in . . . Allen."' 24 The conflict involved in Allen grew out of
a 1965 New York statute 2 which required local school boards to pur-
chase text books and to loan them free of charge to all children attending
the first through twelfth grades in any school in the district. This, of
course, included those children attending parochial schools.
The Board of Education of Central School District Number 1 in
Rensselaer and Columbia counties brought suit to enjoin the Com-
issioner of Education from removing them for non-compliance with the
law and seeking an order to restrain distribution of funds for the purchase
of books to be used by parochial school students. The complaint alleged
that the statute violated both the New York and federal Constitutions. 28
The trial court held for the plaintiffs and declared the law uncon-
stitutional.2 7 On appeal the decision was reversed. 2 The New York
120. See notes 216-17 infra and accompanying text.
121. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
122. Id. at 375.
123. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
124. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 74 CASE & Com., Nov.-Dec., 1969, 3.
125. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
126. 392 U.S. 236, 240 (1968).
127. 51 Misc. 2d 297, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, Albany County
1966).
128. 27 App. Div. 2d 69, 276 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 3d Dept. 1966).
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Court of Appeals, by a vote of 4-3, ruled that the law was not uncon-
stitutional,129 and the case went to the United States Supreme Court.The
Supreme Court upheld the statute in a 6-3 decision, relying on Everson
and using the Schempp test.180
The law merely makes available to all children the benefits
of a general program to lend school books free of charge....
Thus no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools,
and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to
schools.18'
The Court, through Justice White, stressed that books are not
religious in character and that any book provided to parochial school
students must be approved by public school authorities.' Justice White
referred to the "meager record" and indicated that "secular and religious
training are [not] so intertwined" that an "unconstitutional involve-
ment" between church and state had occurred.'
Justice Harlan wrote in his concurring opinion:
I would hold that where the contested governmental activity
is calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within
the competence of the State, and where the activity does not
involve the State "so significiantly and directly in the realm
of the sectarian as to give rise to . . . divisive influences and
inhibitions of freedom," it is not forbidden by the religious
clauses of the First Amendment.'"
Separate dissenting opinions were written by Justices Black, Douglas
and Fortas. Justice Black minced no words in voicing his opposition
to the majority position. "I believe the New York law held valid is a
flat, flagrant, open violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments . . . .""' His statements in support of his dissent were in keeping
with those he made in Everson and McCollum. Justice Black indicated
that although books are secular, their use "realistically will in some way
inevitably tend to propagate the religious views of the favored sect."' 86
In his view, Everson and McCollum provided ample ground on which to
129. 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967).
130. 392 U.S. 236, 243.
131. Id. at 243-44 (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 244.
133. Id. at 248.
134. Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 250.
136. Id. at 252.
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invalidate the New York statute.
The Everson and McCollum cases plainly interpret the First
and Fourteenth Amendments as protecting the taxpayers of a
State from being compelled to pay taxes to their government
to support the agencies of private religious organizations the
taxpayers oppose.'
Justice Black feared, as had Justice Rutledge in Everson, that the
decision would be further extended to provide other types of aid to
parochial education.
It requires no prophet to foresee that on the argument used to
support this law others could be upheld providing for state
or federal government funds . . . to pay the salaries of the
religious school teachers, and finally to have the sectarian
groups cease to rely on voluntary contributions of members
of their sects while waiting for the Government to pick up all
the bills for the religious schools.'
Justice Douglas pointed out that textbooks may indeed have
religious overtones. 9 This fact could have serious consequences in
terms of the process to be used for selecting "approved" books and could
inject a note of divisiveness into society.
Now that "secular" textbooks will pour into religious schools,
we can rest assured that a contest will be on to provide those
books for religious schools which the dominant religious group
concludes best reflect the theocentric or other philosophy of the
particular church.'4
He further noted that divisiveness can work in two directions, either
toward church control of the state or toward state control of the church.4
Justice Fortas pointed out, contrary to the assumption apparently
made by the majority, that the books are selected and prescribed by
religious authorities; individual students, those who are said to request
and receive the books, can use no others. 42 In addition, while the bus
ride in Everson was essentially the same for all students, the books to
137. Id. at 251.
138. Id. at 253.
139. Id. at 258-62.
140. Id. at 265 (footnote omitted). See also Note, Sectarian Books, the Supreme
Court and the Establishment Clause, 79 YALE L.J. 111 (1969).
141. 392 U.S. 236, 262 (1968).
142. Id. at 270.
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be furnished are "special, separate, and particular books . . . chosen by
religious sects or their representatives ... ."' Thus, he concluded, furnish-
ing textbooks is not at all comparable to providing public health and
safety measures such as those approved in Jverson.
Allen has raised many important questions. Some of these may
shortly be answered by the decisions in cases now before the United
States Supreme Court.'44 Professor Freund calls the case the "beginning,
not the end, of constitutional litigation . . . to determine the bounds
of public aid to parochial schools."' 4 ' Cases involving the application of
a voucher plan could well provide further chapters in the story.
Miscellany
A number of other court cases and opinions should also be con-
sidered. Among these are cases from lower federal courts and state
courts and a number of Opinions of the Justices of state supreme courts.
Most of these cases and opinions deal with questions arising from plans
which would authorize states to purchase secular instructional services
from parochial schools.
Several state supreme courts have been called upon to deliver
opinions concerning the constitutionality of such plans. The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire 4 ' considered proposed bills which would,
inter alia, 1 ) provide tax exemptions to parents with children attend-
ing non-public schools, 2) provide transportation for children attending
non-public schools outside the school district in which they live, 3)
furnish physician, nurse, health, guidance, psychologist, educational test-
ing and other services to students of all schools and 4) provide for text-
book loans to students of all schools. The court indicated the belief that
tax exemptions were unconstitutional,4 7 that the transportation services
were of doubtful constitutionality,"' that providing health and education-
al services was probably constitutional. 9 and that the loaning of textbooks
was constitutional. 150
The Maine House of Representatives requested that state's Supreme
Judicial Court to determine whether any provision of the proposed
143. Id. at 271.
144. See notes 231-33 infra and accompanying text.
145. Freund, supra note 124, at 4.
146. Opinion of the Justices, 109 N. H. 578, 258 A. 2d 343 (1969).
147. Id. at -, 258 A.2d at 346.
148. Id. at -, 258 A.2d at 347.
149. Id. at -, 258 A.2d at 347.
150. Id. at -, 258 A.2d at 347.
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Education Assistance Act... violated either the establishment or free
exercise clauses of the United States Constitution. The law authorized
local school administrative units "to contract and pay for secular educa-
tion service" if the closing of non-public schools would 1) cause the tax
rate to rise or 2) if such closing would create overcrowding in the public
schools. As regards the question of the establishment clause, the court
determined the law to be unconstitutional as applied to sectarian schools.'
Three of the justices felt bound by the Schempp test.
Applying the Schempp test, the purpose and primary effect
of L.D. 1751 is to subsidize those sectarian schools, the closing
of which would cast an increased student burden on the public
school system . . . .Such subsidation by its assuring the con-
tinuance of the school, assures the continuance of the purpose
for which the school exists, -advancement of the faith it
represents.'
One justice concurred but would limit his findings to schools
"providing instruction in both sectarian and secular subjects."'" 4 Two
other justices declared the law to be constitutional, seeing it as a logical
extension of the Everson and Allen decisions.'55 All six justices agreed
that the law presented no conflict with the free exercise clause since there
would be no coercion to attend parochial schools.'56
An opinion by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts5 .
considered only whether a pending legislative bill authorizing purchase
of secular educational services was in conflict with provisions of the
Massachusetts Constitution.' The court apparently considered that the
legislature had a legitimate purpose in proposing the law. 55 However,
the effect of the law was found to be in conflict with a state constitutional
provision which states:
[N]o grant, appropriation or use of public money or property
or loan of public credit shall be made or authorized by the
commonwealth or any political division thereof for .. .aiding
151. H.P. No. 1395, Maine Nonpublic Elementary Education Assistance Act
(1970).
152. Opinion of the Justices, 261 A2d 58, 66 (1970).
153. Id. at 67.
154. Id. at 68.
155. Id. at 70.
156. Id. at 76.
157. Opinion of the Justices, -Mass.-, 258 N.E.2d 779 (1970).
158. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. CONST. AMEN". art. XLVI, §2 (1919).
159. -Mass. at -, 258 N.E.2d at 782. The purpose of the bill was to promote the
general welfare by improving education.
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any school . . . whether under public control or otherwise,
wherein any denominational doctrine is inculcated. . .. "'
The Michigan Supreme Court held a similar proposed statute did
not offend the establishment clause.' The court adhered to the Schempp
test and found that the primary effect of the act was neither to advance
nor inhibit religion.'62 Two justices dissented and would have declared
the act unconstitutional. 8
Other cases involving similar questions include DiCenso v. Robin-
son 64 and Johnson v. Sanders.'6' Both courts were of the opinion that
the laws were invalid. Clayton v. Kervick86. considered the question of a
New Jersey statute authorizing financing of facilities for both secular
and religious schools on a self-liquidating basis. The law was upheld. 6 '
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Seegers v. Parker6 held invalid a
law authorizing state purchase of secular instructional services from
teachers in parochial schools.
A BRIEF IN FAVOR OF VOUCHERS
Contained within the report of the Jenks group for the OEO is an
appendix which presents arguments in favor of the constitutionality of
the voucher plan.'69 The central question of the appendix is: "What
features of the voucher program best protect it from successful con-
stitutional challenge? '' 17O Since the Report was compiled under the
sponsorship of the OEO, and since the OEO will sponsor the voucher
experiment, the arguments contained in the appendix are presented
herein in support of the plan's constitutionality. Four major cases which
have dealt with the issue of governmental support of the secular functions
of religious groups are used to support the Report's position. In each of
the four cases, Bradfield v. Roberts,"' Quick Bear v. Leupp,' 2 Everson".8
and Allen,"4 the support was held to be constitutional.
160. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. CoNsT. AMEND. art. XLVI, §2.
161. In re Legislature's Request for an Opinion, 384 Mich. 82, 180 N.W.2d 265(1970).
162. Id. at -, 180 N.W.2d at 273.
163. Id. at -, 180 N.W.2d at 275.
164. 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
165. 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1970).
166. 56 N.J. 525, 267 A.2d 503 (1970).
167. Id.
168. 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970).
169. JENKS REPORT 131.
170. Id.
171. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
172. 210 U.S. 50 (1905).
173. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
174. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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The Report seeks to support the voucher plan against challenge from
the establishment clause on two major premises.
First, the essential feature of the voucher program-its reliance
on individual freedom of choice-makes it constitutionally
immune. The first premise of this argument is that private
acts which may benefit religion are not constitutionally pro-
hibited. The second premise is that the voucher program puts
effective control of the educational funds in private hands ...
Second, and in the alternative, the program envisioned by
this report does not confer unconstitutional benefits on religious
institutions. The vouchers are to cover no more than the cost
of secular education. Allen and other cases make it clear that
this is a constitutional expenditure even when religious in-
stitutions are instrumental in its effectiveness."
Education Vouchers Legally Embody Only Private Support and Are
Therefore Constitutional
The first point above relies for its basis upon Quick Bear v.
Leupp"' In Quick Bear, the Supreme Court upheld the expenditure of
government funds through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to support
a Catholic school on a Sioux Indian reservation. The expenditure was
upheld because 1) the Indians were entitled to the money and 2) the
ultimate destination of the money was freely determined by the Indians
and not the Government. 7
The Report argues, by analogy, that both these features would be
present in a voucher plan. The voucher plan itself would entitle every
school age child to "use vouchers at eligible schools."1 7 1 In addition,
most states have constitutional provisions requiring them to provide for
the education of the young.
179
The entitlement of the young to state-purchased education
would be, in fact, no less significant under the voucher program
than it was in Quick Bear. . . .Thus the requisite entitlement
would exist.'
The free choice aspect is provided by the fact that, under a voucher
175. JENKS REPORT 132.
176. 210 U.S. 50 (1905).
177. JENKS REPORT 133.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 134.
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plan, the parents and children would have complete control over their
individual use of the voucher, i.e., they could select the school the child
is to attend. Any possible benefit to the school selected would occur
"only through and after the intervening exercise of private choice." 18'
In Quick Bear the Indians themselves chose the school; they were
entitled to the money because of their treaty with the United States.
They also chose to spend the money on a particular mode of education.
Under a voucher plan children would be entitled to a sum of money
(voucher) to be used for education; they could exercise free choice in
selecting a school. The plan thus becomes immune to constitutional attack.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the voucher program, as
a way of facilitating private free choice, is immune to successful
attack on Establishment grounds. Quick Bear v. Leupp seems
directly on point and controlling ....
Once the freedom of individual choice is assured, the
voucher program probably can be defended from Constitu-
tional attack. It is the choice of private parties that determines
to whom the state pays money, and, without government
selection of the recipient of the funds, the government can in
no way be accused of violation of the Establishment clause even
if a benefit accrues to the recipient of the funds. 82
Education Vouchers Limited to the Cost of Secular Education in Sectar-
ian Schools Confer No Proscribed Benefit on Those Institutions
The second argument is that even if the intervention of free choice
does not protect the voucher plan, the fact that the plan is designed to
pay no more than the cost of the secular educational services involved is
sufficient. 8 ' Some aid to religious institutions has been sanctioned;
police and fire protection, transportation of pupils, free textbooks, school
lunches and health services have all been approved."8 The question is
resolved in terms of the Schempp test, the test of purpose and effect.
The Report indicates that the voucher plan meets the requirements
of the test in both particulars. As to purpose,
[T]he purposes of the voucher scheme are implicit both in
the problems that gave rise to its being proposed and in the
organization of the programs. It is a scheme designed to pro-
181. Id. at 135.
182. Id. at 139.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 140.
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mote better education, not religious proselytizing. That this
is a legitimate secular purpose is not open to question.
Since the Schempp test also includes the question of primary effect,
the Report considers the voucher plan in that light. While conceding
that direct money grants would be "suspect," the Report concludes that
to determine that direct grants are unconstitutional is "to ignore the
reasoning of these cases [Everson and Allen] and to rely on surface
language."18 The proper basis for a decision is said to be the use to which
the grant will be put.'
Two plans are proposed which would protect the voucher system
from attack. One plan is to make the voucher program a purchase of
services arrangement which would pay only the actual cost of the secular
instruction provided. The other is to pay a parochial school less than the
actual cost of the secular services, thus insuring that the voucher funds
could not be used for sectarian purposes. In either event, the Report sees
the children and not the schools as the primary beneficiaries of vouchers
"for it is their education which is supported by the vouchers.' 88
This contention is based, in part, upon a semantic distinction
between "recipient" and "beneficiary." A recipient is said to be the one
"who receives the money or goods" while a beneficiary is "the one for
whose benefit the money is spent."'8 9 A religious group which operated
a hospital received funds for the care of poor patients in Bradfield v.
Roberts.9 ' The hospital was termed a recipient while the indigent
patients were said to be the beneficiaries.' In a voucher system the
schools could be termed recipients of the aid, but the students would be
the beneficiaries. Since the schools must "reciprocate with secular services
of equal or greater value, no benefit is bestowed upon the institution.""2
Similarly, the religious functions of the institution do not benefit; the
money received pays only for the secular services rendered. Thus, the
Report indicates that
payment of the cost of secular services does not confer a benefit
on the institution as a whole. Its effect is to enhance secular
educational services. If the program has any tangential effect
185. Id. at 142.
186. Id. at 144.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 145.
189. Id.
190. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
191. JENKS REPORT 145.
192. Id. at 146.
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on the religious activities of religious institutions, they are
like those noted by the Court in Everson and Allen and,
therefore, would not sustain successful constitutional chal-
lenge.'98
In conclusion, the Report states two main grounds for considering
vouchers constitutionally protected:
1) Any benefit that accrues to a religion is not the result
of government action, but rather of the free choice of private
individuals. Such a benefit is not constitutionally proscribed.
2) The program is designed to cover only the cost of secular
education. As such, no proscribed benefit is conferred on
religious institutions.19'
In addition to these reasons, the Report states that an understanding of
the contemporary legal climate gives more support to the contention
that the courts would uphold a voucher plan. One justification for this
position is found by comparing vouchers with the G.I. Bill which permits
funds to reach sectarian institutions. The Report further says that the
Supreme Court has rejected a strict, formalistic approach to the resolution
of church-state issues and expresses a belief that present conditions
within our society will force courts to be sympathetic toward govern-
mental attempts to provide financial support to parochial schools. 5
A BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO VOUCHERS
The arguments made in favor of the constitutionality of the voucher
plan may seem convincing. Numerous writers and groups, however, have
stated positions which are in opposition to the plan. Their positions are
generally based upon non-legal considerations. The remaining portions of
this note will attempt to shed further light on the constitutional issues
and to hazard a guess as to the eventual outcome of a case involving the
voucher plan.
The Private Support Argument
At first glance the argument that education vouchers are, in reality,
private means of supporting educational institutions seems valid. It is
the child, or the parent, who is "entitled" to the voucher; it is the child,
or again the parent, who decides where to utilize the voucher. If these
premises be accepted, then the conclusion swiftly follows that it is the
193. Id. at 147.
194. Id. at 156.
195. Id. at 157.
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individual who provides the support and not the government at all.
The argument, however, seems analogous to the thought processes
of one who erects a sheet of transparent plastic film in front of some
unwanted or unsightly object and then pretends that the object does
not exist. The object is still there; anyone looking past the surface of
the covering would recognize it. If we look past the surface of "entitle-
ment" and "free choice," we can easily comprehend that the government
is, in fact, paying for the educational services involved.
Quick Bear seems to give little, if any, backing to the private support
argument. The Government had promised, by way of treaty, to provide
funds for the education of the Indians, i.e., the Government had agreed
to give the money to the Indians. In contrast, states have not promised
to give money to individuals for their education; states have bound
themselves to provide an education for the children. The premise that
children are entitled to receive the funds with which to secure an educa-
tion is, at best, tenuous.
The fact of free choice in the selection of a school is, likewise, of
small importance. The funds still come from the government. The govern-
ment would still be directly financing an education in a parochial school
and the scheme of having the voucher pass through the hands of parents
or children is a mere subterfuge or indirect method of financing such
an education. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in the Schempp
case, remarked that "[w]hat may not be done directly may not be done
indirectly lest the Establishment Clause become a mockery."' 98
The No Benefit Argument
A voucher plan for financing education is said to be immune from
attack since the funds would pay only the cost of the secular instructional
services actually rendered.' 7 It must be conceded that the purpose of
the voucher plan, to insure better education for all children, cannot be
questioned. That the state has a legitimate interest in providing education
for all its citizens was recognized by the Court in Everson.' Purpose,
however, is only one aspect of the test; the effect must also be considered.
The Report's position is that since the voucher would pay only for the
secular services rendered (or for only a portion thereof under an option)
no benefit accrues to the parochial school involved.
The legitimacy of this position, however, should be considered in
light of the present situation. Parochial schools today must finance not
196. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963).
197. JENKS RPO RT 139.
198. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
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only their sectarian instruction but also- the secular portions. If the secular
instruction were paid for out of public funds, the money previously spent
for such instruction would be freed for use in the program of religious
education. Moreover, it has been recognized that the mere continuation
of the school assures the continuance of its primary purpose, the impart-
ing of religious education, and thereby advances the faith the school
represents.199 To argue that either of these effects would not constitute
a benefit to the parochial institution is to refuse to face reality.
The distinction made between recipient and beneficiary seems
chimerical. The term beneficiary is not restricted to the meaning ascribed
to it in the Report-that a beneficiary is the "one for whose benefit the
money is spent."2 ' The definition also encompasses "one who receives
. . . advantages." '' The parochial school which no longer is forced to
bear the expense of its secular educational program receives a decided
advantage."'
One additional point deserves mention. The Report stresses that
an arrangement which provides only the actual cost (or a portion thereof)
of the secular education may withstand constitutional attack.202 This
presupposes that the actual cost of such services is readily ascertainable.
One of the recent cases, DiCenso v. Robinson,"4 considered this question.
The court there noted that the various expenses of a religious school
could, by a sophisticated method of bookkeeping, be almost wholly
charged off to the school's secular program, thus providing an almost
total subsidy to the religious institution.20 5 Justice Douglas, in his con-
curring opinion in Schempp, also addressed the problem. He wrote:
Financing a church either in its strictly religious activities
or in its other activities is equally unconstitutional, as I under-
stand the Establishment Clause. Budgets for one activity may
be technically separable from budgets for others. But the institu-
tion is an inseparable whole, a living organism, which is
strengthened in proselytizing when it is strengthened in any
199. 261 A.2d at 67.
200. JENKS REPORT 145.
201. AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 144 (1953).
202. The school might use the money thus gained in a variety of ways; teacher
salaries could be raised, additional equipment might be purchased, programs could be
expanded, tuition charges might be lowered or the money saved might be spent on
various religious activities of the sponsoring church.
203. JENKs REPORT 145.
204. 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
205. Id. at 120.
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department by contributions from other than its own mem-
bers."o'
The Purpose of Sectarian Schools
The Court in Allen complained of an incomplete record.2"' Pro-
fessor Freund has suggested that had the record been clear as to the total
atmosphere of the school and the manner in which the books were to be
used the result in Allen might have been different.0 8
The Supreme Court has often pointed out the very facts the majority
in Allen declined to affirm by judicial notice. In his dissent in Allen
Justice Douglas noted that
[i]t must be remembered that the very existence of the
religious school-whether Catholic or Mormon, Presbyterian
or Episcopalian-is to provide an education oriented to the
dogma of the particular faith.20
Justice Jackson, dissenting in Everson, said that the function of a
parochial school is to foster and proselytize its faith and that such purpose
should "occupy the first place."21 Justice Douglas remarked in a con-
curring opinion in Schempp that "[e]ducation, too, is usually high on
the priority list of church interests." '' The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine also expressed similar sentiments when it said that "[s]ectarian
school education is selected for its religious atmosphere and teaching."21
If these statements are not considered sufficient, one need only look
to the utterances of church authorities. No less an authority than Pope
Pius XI once stated that
the only school approved by the Church is one where . . . the
Catholic religion permeates the entire atmosphere [and where]
all teaching and the whole organization of the school and its
teachers, syllabus and textbooks in every branch [is] regulated
by the Christian spirit.218
The Reverend Joseph H. Fichter has written:
It is a commonplace observation that in the parochial school
206. 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963) (footnote omitted).
207. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 US. 235, 248 (1968).
208. Freund, supra note 124, at 5.
209. 392 U.S. 236, 262 (1968) (footnote omitted).
210. 330 U.S. 1, 22-23.
211. 374 U.S. at 227-28 (footnote omitted).
212. Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d 58, 67 (1970).
213. Encyclical On the Christian Education of Youth, quoted in J. REDDEN & F.
RYAN, A CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 118 (1942).
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religion permeates the whole curriculum and is not confined
to a single half-hour period of the day. Even arithmetic can
be used as an instrument of pious thoughts... 21
If one accepts these words, the words of eminent courts and
jurists and of a world religious leader and a religious scholar, the con-
clusion seems inevitable. The conclusion must be that the atmosphere of
religion and religious teaching so permeates the parochial school that a
truly meaningful separation of church and state under the voucher plan
would be impossible. However, it might be suggested that a simple
device could alleviate the problem. We should now consider that subject.
A Religionless Parochial School--What of Free Exercise?
Up to now the discussion has largely centered upon the problem of
reconciling a voucher system with the establishment clause of the first
amendment. But what if it be proposed that, in order to qualify as an
approved school, the parochial school must delete religion from its
daily schedule? Religious classes might well be taught after regular
school hours to avoid conflict. Would this satisfy the question of establish-
ment? More importantly, could this plan withstand the challenge of the
parochial school itself on free exercise grounds?
If it were necessary for a parochial school to remove religious
instruction from its regular schedule, the very purpose for which such
schools have been established would be defeated. The schools are estab-
lished and supported by the church and parents who choose to send their
children to them to impart religious training. The secular education
provided by the sectarian school could be obtained as well in the public
schools. 1 ' Would it not impinge upon the free exercise of religion to
insist that parochial schools not teach religion?
Pierce v. Society of Sisters21 established that parochial schools can,
be used as an alternative to the public system, i.e., parents can satisfy
the state's requirement that all children receive a certain degree of
education by sending their children to sectarian schools. If religion
cannot be a part of the curriculum of parochial schools, such parents and
children will have lost a portion of their right of free exercise.
The possible effect of the decision in McCollum should also be
considered at this point. McCollum tells us that a system of released time
214. J. FIcnTER, PAROcHiAL SCHOOLS: A SOCIOLOGICAxL STIDY 86 (1958).
215. One of the chief objections mentioned about parochial school education is
that some think it to be inferior in quality to that obtained in the public schools. See,
e.g., L. PFEFFER, supra note 73, at 514.
216. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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for religious instruction is unconstitutional if such instruction is carried
out in the buildings of the public schools. If parochial schools are approved
to receive voucher funds, they, in effect, become arms of the public school
system. They would be supported, at least in the secular aspects of their
programs, as participating members of a publicly financed educational
system. If the parochial schools could be considered a part of the public
education program, then it logically follows that, under McCollum,
there could be no religious instruction carried out in the buildings of
the parochial schools.
A New Twist to an Old Test
One of the most recent cases decided by the Supreme Court which
has a possible bearing on the voucher system is Walz v. Tax Commission
of the City of New York.21 The plaintiff, Walz, owned certain real
estate in Richmond County, New York, and brought suit to enjoin the
New York Tax Commission from giving exemptions to religious organ-
izations for religious properties used solely for religious purposes. His
contention was that such exemptions indirectly required him to contribute
to religious bodies and thus violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment.
The Court emphasized that its prior decisions were intended to
apply to the various factual situations found in the cases and were not to
be taken as broad general principles.21
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment
and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or
governmental interference with religion. Short of these ex-
pressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play
in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference. 19
The tax exemptions in question were said to involve some indirect
benefit to religion but were held constitutional.
Of most immediate concern to this note is the new twist placed on
the Schempp test. This innovation further refines the "primary effect"
portion of the test. "We must also be sure that the end result-the
effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with religion. The
217. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
218. Id. at 668.
219. Id. at 669.
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test is inescapably one of degree."22 The test was then spelled out in
more detail:
In analyzing either alternative [whether to grant tax exemp-
tions to religious properties] the questions are whether the
involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one
calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an
impermissible degree of entanglement.22'
Several courts have recently applied this refinement to the Schempp
test and the decisions seem applicable to a consideration of the voucher
plan. DiCenso v. Robinson222 and Johnson v. Sanders22 held purchase of
services statutes unconstitutional because, inter alia, such statutes foster
an "excessive entanglement." The Michigan Supreme Court found such
a plan to be free of an excess of entanglement, although two of the
justices dissented.22
Under the provisions of the voucher plan, the state will play an
active role. There will likely be inspections to insure that buildings and
facilities meet health and safety requirements. The state will probably, as
it does now, require compliance with a basic course of instruction to
insure a minimum common content to the programs of approved schools.
There will also be contact for such items as teacher certification, teacher
evaluation, insuring compliance with admissions regulations, educational
testing, health services, guidance and numerous other functions. As
regards the parochial schools, the state will likely insist on elaborate
and detailed financial statements and will closely scrutinize the book-
keeping and accounting methods and records of the schools involved. It
would seem, therefore, that the state and federal governments may have
a close and continuing relationship with the parochial schools that would
foster the "excessive government entanglement" forbidden by Walz.
Indeed, the Court notes in Walz that:
Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship preg-
nant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant
programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administra-
tive relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative
standards.2 5
220. Id. at 674.
221. Id. at 675.
222. 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
223. 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1970).
224. In re Legislature's Request for an Opinion, 384 Mich. 82, 180 N.W.2d 265
(1970).
225. 397 U.S. at 675.
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CONCLUSION
An education voucher plan, while it may seem justified on purely
sociological or educational grounds, contains elements which probably
will not withstand the challenge of the establishment clause of the first
amendment. The first amendment "was intended to erect a 'wall of
separation between Church and State.' "2"6 The first amendment was
seen by its framers as forbidding "sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activities."2 " The re-
strictions of the establishment clause are a "tight rope"'228 which must be
walked. The path of this tight rope is too narrow to be negotiated by the
voucher system. The voucher plan, if implemented, would free parochial
schools of the financial burden of their secular education programs. Under
the Schempp test this should be considered a primary effect, although
not the only one, of such a plan.
Under a voucher program the functions of secular and sectarian
education would be fused. Justice Frankfurter has written that "[s] epar-
ation is a requirement to abstain from fusing functions of Government
and of religious sects . ,, ." In Zorach v. Clauson the Court said that
"Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious
instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular
institutions to force one or some religion on any person. ' 23 0
The fact that voucher payments would reach parochial schools
indirectly does not provide immunity from constitutional attack. The
money for which vouchers may be redeemed is nonetheless tax money;
payments would be made by a voucher agency or by a local school
board. Both must be considered agents of the government.
ADDENDUM
As this note is being prepared, a case is before the United States
Supreme Court which could be decisive of the question of a voucher
plan's constitutionality. The case is Lemon v. Kurtzman,23 1 and a
226 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
227. 397 U.S. at 668.
228. Id. at 672.
229. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948).
230. 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
231. 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The case was appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. Appeal docketed, No. 89, 397 U.S. 1034 (1970). Three additional cases
were scheduled for oral argument on the same days as Lemon. Robinson v. DiCenso,
prob. juris. noted, No. 570, 91 S. Ct. 142 (1970) ; Early v. DiCenso, prob. jiuis. noted,
No. 569, 91 S. Ct. 142 (1970) ; Tilton v. Richardson, prob. juris. noted, No. 153, 90 S.
Ct. 2200 (1970). Arguments were heard on March 2-3, 1971. 39 U.S.L.W. 3381 (1971).
19711
et al.: Education Vouchers—Challenge to the Wall of Separation?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
602 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
decision may well be announced before this note reaches print. For that
reason, the case must be mentioned here.
The issue in Lemon v. Kurtzman is whether the State of Pennsyl-
vania may constitutionally provide a fixed annual amount to be paid to
parochial schools for instruction in mathematics, modern foreign lan-
guages and physical training. The funds would be derived from the
state's revenue from a cigarette tax and could presumably be used in the
discretion of the individual school."' The statute was upheld by a
majority of a three-judge district court. 38
Should such a plan as this be held constitutional, a voucher plan
should also withstand the challenge of the first amendment. A purchase
of services plan, such as the one in question in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
provides for payments of money directly from the state to the parochial
schools; one of the features relied upon to make the voucher program
immune from successful constitutional attack is that payments are made
indirectly through the parents. If, however, the Pennsylvania statute is
declared unconstitutional, then the church-state issue will rise up again
in a challenge to the voucher experiment.*
232. Freund, supra note 124, at 4.
233. 310 F. Supp. 35 (1969).
* As this issue went to press, the United States Supreme Court announced its
decision in Lemon and DiCenso v. Robinson. See notes 164, 204 and 222 supra and
accompanying text. A unanimous Court, Justice Marshall not taking part, held that
the statute in each case fostered an excessive entanglement between church and state
and was, therefore, invalid. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 39 U.S.L.W. 4844 (U.S. June 28,
1971).
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